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Contrary to what is often assumed, object wide scope (OWS)readings are 
in fact severely restricted. Liu (1990) conducted the first systematic study of 
the scope readings of transitive sentences involving a wide variety of quantified 
NPs. The data in (1) are illustrative of the restrictions she found: :2 
(1) a. 
b. 
Two referees read every abstract 
'for every abstract there are two referees that read it' 
Two referees read three abstracts 
? 'there are three abstracts and each of them was read by two 
(possibly different) referees' 
c. Two referees read at least three abstracts 
11 'there are at least three abstracts such that each of them was 
read by two (possibly different) referees' 
d. Two referees read exactly three abstracts 
* 'there are exactly three abstracts such that each of them was 
read by two (possibly different) referees' 
e. Two referees read more than three abstracts 
* 'there are more than three abstracts such that each of them was 
read by two (possibly different) referees' 
f . Two referees read fewer than three abstracts 
* 'there are fewer than three abstracts such that each of them was 
read by two (possibly different) referees' 
g. Two referees read no abstracts 
* 'there are no abstracts such that each of them was read by two 
(possibly different) referees' 
(la) is an example of NPs in which the determiner is a distributive uni­
versal like every or each. (1 b) is an example of NPs whose determiner is a 
lThis research was partially supported by NSF grant DBS 9222501. Filippo Beghelli, 
Ed Keenan, Murat Kural, Friederike Moltmann and Ed Stabler made helpful comments on 
earlier drafts. The paper would not have been written without Anna Szabolcsi's support 
and advice. All errors are mine. 
2We follow Liu in restricting ourselves to Don-partitive NPs. While no account of OWS 
is complete without considering partitives, the judgements concerning their scope taking 
abilities are delicate and more empirical research is needed before any theoretical conclusions 
can be reached. 
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numeral: a, some or a number like three. (1c)-(1£) are examples of NPs whose 
determiner is a modified numeral: more than three, exactly three, fewer than 
three, etc. (1g) is an NP whose determiner is no. Crucially, the readings that 
are missing in (1) are not incoherent. For example, the missing OWS read­
ing of Two referees read at least three abstracts is the preferred reading of the 
corresponding passive and negative fronting with subject-aux inversion in (2a) 
and (2b) (from Szabolcsi and Zwarts(1992)). 
(2) a. 
b. 
Fewer than three abstracts were read by two referees 
Fewer than three abstracts did two referees read 
There are two obvious questions to be answered now. First, what is the 
positive property that characterizes noun phrases that are able to take OWS? 
And second, whatever this property turns out to be, what is it about OWS 
that requires the presence of this property? In this paper we suggest that the 
answers derive from the following specific properties of the syntax-semantics 
interface: 
(3) a. 
b. 
c. 
d. 
e. 
f .  
An OWS reading is available only if the object NP is interpreted 
as a principal filter. 
The distinctive syntactic property of an OWS reading is that 
it involves inverse scope: the scope order does not match the 
order of argument positions (which is roughly the S-structure 
c-command order of the arguments). 
Readings involving inverse scope may be derived in either of 
two ways: (i) Using unary quantifiers, which are applied in an 
order that reverses their lexical order, or (ii) Using an n-ary 
quantifier, which applies to the denotation of the verb to yield 
the denotation of the sentence in a single step. 
It will be argued that (i), the application of unary quantifiers in 
a non-lexical order is only possible if lexical argument order is 
clearly overridden by a syntactic process, e.g. surface movement. 
This restriction will be motivated empirically, with reference to 
contrasts like those between (If) and (2b), as well as theoret­
ically, with reference to an algebraic approach to generalized 
quantifiers which is called semantic trees. 
It follows that only (ii), the n-ary quantifier option, is available 
for sentences of type (1). N-ary quantifiers are in general not 
run-of-the-mill compositional entities. It is therefore not surpris­
ing to find that only simple special cases are actually attested 
in natural language. 
We show that the OWS reading can be calculated by a partic­
ular, relatively simple n-ary quantifier just in case the object 
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denotes a principal filter. This is the explanation of the obser­
vation in (3a). 
An alternative proposal to account for Liu's generalizations has been 
made independently in Beghelli (1993) within the framework of Government 
and Binding Theory. Roughly, Beghelli assumes that only distribu tive univer­
sals undergo QR. Unmodified indefinites acquire virtual scope via existential 
closure. Modified indefinites are quantifiers but neither QR nor existential clo­
sure is available to them, hence they take scope in situ. Beghelli's predictions 
and mine are by and large compatible; a detailed comparison is outside the 
scope of this paper. 
2 On the calculation of OWS readings 
In this section we provide intuitive motivation for the claim that OWS 
readings are derived using the binary quantifier (Q2>Q1) in (4). 
(4) (Q2 > Ql)().x).y[R(x, y)]) = true 
iff Va E A, Ql(Ax[R(x, a)]) = true, 
where A is a. unique set determined by Q2. 
Let (5) be a simple tra.nsitive sentence. 
(5) NP1 [V NP2] 
To say that (5) has an OWS reading is to claim that it can have the mean­
ing in (6), where Q2 is the quantifier expressed by NP2, Ql is the quantifier 
expressed by NPl, and R is the relation expressed by V. 
(6) Q2().y[Q1().x[R(x, y)])]) 
Standard scope mechanisms like QR derive the meaning in (6) for any 
sentence of the form (5) in which NPI and NP2 are quantified NPs. In partic­
ular, they treat NPs like every abstract and fewer than three abstracts exactly 
alike. They thus derive the reading in (6) for the sentences in both (780) and 
(7b). 
(7) a. 
h. 
Two referees read every abstract 
'for every abstract there are two referees that read it' 
Two referees read fewer than three abstracts 
* 'there are fewer than three abstracts such that each of them was 
read by two (possibly different) referees' 
Using the standard view of compositional semantics, let us assume that (6) 
actually encodes the way in which the desired meaning is obtained. It says 
then that (8) is a subpart of the meaning of (6): 
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(8) -Xy[Ql(Ax[R(x, y)])] 
This amounts to saying that (7a) is calculated by first forming the set of entities 
that are read by two referees, and then asking whether this set contains every 
abstract. Similarly, in the case of (7b), we calculate the set of entities read by 
two referees and ask whether this set contains fewer than three abstracts. 
Now we know that (7a) does have the predicted reading and (7b) does 
not. This suggests that in reality even the existing reading of (7a) is not 
obtained in the way described above. Presumably, it is obtained in a different 
way that is not available to (7b), hence the contrast. 
One alternative way for calculating (7a) is as follows. Instead of starting 
with forming the set of things read by two referees, start with the set of 
abstracts and ask whether everyone of them was read by two referees. In this 
case the set of things that were read by two referees is never constructed. 3 
In the case of (7a) this latter way of calculating the OWS seems to 
calculate the right truth conditions. Will this be the case for any choice of 
the quantifiers Ql and Q2? Notice that this way of calculating has a semantic 
prerequisite: the wide scope quantifier Q2 must somehow determine a unique 
set whose members can be checked in the desired way. Hence the prediction is 
that this calculation will only be available if the quantifier Q2 provides such 
a set. In what follows we will prove that the quantifiers that provide the 
desired set are precisely the principal filters, i.e., we prove that the two ways 
of calculating are equivalent just in case Q2 is a principal filter. The next 
step is to ask which NPs can denote principal filters. We argue below that 
every abstract and three abstracts, for instance, can, while modified numerals 
like least three abstracts, fewer than three abstracts and exactly three abstracts, 
cannot. Notice that Liu (1990) found that NPs like every abstract and three 
abstract are among those that are capable of taking OWS, while NPs like 
at least three abstracts, fewer than three abstracts and exactly three abstracts 
are among those that are not. Thus our speculation concerning calculation 
converges with the empirical data. We will suggest that a natural way to 
capture the calculation with principal filters is to use a binary quantifier like 
(4). This explains why every abstract and three abstracts take OWS but at 
least three abstracts, fewer than three abstracts and exactly three abstracts do 
not: only the former satisfy the semantic prerequisite for the use of (4). We 
may note here that Liu characterized the OWS class with a combination of 
semantic and morphological properties: NPs that denote upward monotonic 
quantifiers and do not contain a "modifier" (at least, more than, etc.). Our 
proposal implies that such a heterogeneous characteriza.tion is not necessary: 
OWS-takers can be characterized in semantic terms. '" In sections 3 and 
3Note the close parallel with Szabolcsi and Zwarts (1992)'s distinction between 'compute' 
a.nd 'look-up' pro<:edures (Section 5.1). 
4The principal filterhood requirement should be understood as a necessary but not as a 
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4 we elaborate on the semantic properties of the binarY quantifier Q1>Q2. 
In section 5 we take up the discussion of the syntax-semantics interface that 
makes it natural to employ specifically a binary quantifier here. Section 6 
places these considerations in the context of semantic trees. 
3 Object wide scope and principal filters 
3.1 Definitions and notational conventions 
We are using the term 'quantifiers' for semantic objects, as in Barwise 
and Cooper (1981). A unary quantifier is a set of sets. An n-ary quantifier 
is a set of n-ary relations. A binary quantifier is a set of binary relations. 
The corresponding syntactic notions involve the number of different variables 
bound by the quantifier: one, more than one and two, respectively. To avoid 
confusion, please note the following notational conventions. 
As is usual, we sometimes think of sets as their characteristic functions. 
In particular, we sometimes think of a unary quantifier as a function from 
sets to the truth values 'true' and 'false'. So we use expressions like (9a) 
interchangeably with expressions like (9b): 
(9) a. {1,2,3}EQ 
b. Q( {I, 2, 3}) = true 
Similarly, we sometimes think of a binary quantifier as function from 
binary relations to the truth values 'true' and 'false'. We also use lambda 
notation to represent some sets and binary relations. So a binary relation is 
written as either (lOa) or (lOb). 
(10) a. R 
b. '\xAy[R(x, y)] 
An expression like (11 b) in which Q is a binary quantifier is therefore 
just another way of saying (l1a) . 
(11) a. REQ 
b. Q(,\x,\y[R(x, y)]) = true 
Finally, we will consistently use Q2 for the denotation of the object and 
Q1 for the denotation of the subject. 
sufficient condition for OWS taking. Another semantic property that is likely to playa role 
when partitives and definite NPs are considered is distributivity, as (ii) below has an OWS 
reading while (i) does Dot. 
(i) Two referees read the abstracts 
(ii) Two referees read each of the abstracts 
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3.2 The binary quantifier Q2>Q1 
We start by making two standard assumptions. First, an OWS reading 
expresses the meaning in (12) (=6). 
(12) Q2(Ay[Q1(Ax[R(x, V)])]) 
Second, the existence of an OWS for a sentence does not depend on the value 
of R, e.g, whether Two referees read every abstract has an OWS reading does 
not depend on who read what. In other words, whatever is the mechanism 
that derives OWS readings, it has to derive the reading in (12) for every 
binary relation R. In view of the intuitive consideration in section 2, we are 
also making the specific assumption that OWS readings are derived using the 
binary quantifier Q2>Q1 in (13)(=4). 
(13) (Q2> Q1)(AxAy[R(x, V)]) = true 
iff Va E A, Q1(Ax[R(x, a)]) = true, 
where A is a unique set determined by Q2. 
In section 3.3 we formally address the question for which quantifiers Ql 
and Q2 the readings (Q2 > Ql)(AxAy[R(x, V)]) and Q2(Ay[Q1(Ax[R(x, V)])]) 
are equivalent for every binary relation R, and prove that this equivalence 
holds just in case Q2 is a principal filter. 
3.3 The formal role of principal filters in Q2>Q1 
Let Q1,Q2 be unary quantifiers over a universe E. 
Lemma If Q1 is non-trivial 5 then there is a set A such that (i) and 
(ii) are equivalent for all binary relations R, iff Q2 is a principal filter. 
(i) Va E A, Q1(Ax[R(x,a)]) = true 
(ii) Q2(Ay[Q1(Ax[R(x,y)])D = true 
Proof: 
Since Q1 is non trivial, Ay[Q1(AX[R(x, V)])] can be any property P, i.e., 
for every property P there is a binary relation R such that Ay[Q1(Ax[R(x, V)])] 
= P. Therefore it is enough to prove that there is a set A such that (i') and 
(ii') are equivalent for every property P, iff Q2 is a principal filter. 
(i') Va E A, P(a) = true 
(ii') Q2(AY[P(y)]) = true 
Thinking about quantifiers now as sets of sets, this amounts to proving 
that there is a set A such that (i") and (ii") are equivalent for every set X, iff 
Q2 is a principal :filter. 
Ql is Dot alwa.ys true or alwa.ys false. 
(i") A!;;; X 
(ii") X E Q2 
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And this is true by definition, as principal filters are defined as in (14). 
(14) A quantifier Q2 is a principal filter iff 
3A � E such that VX!;;; E, A � X iff X E Q2 c 
The set A in (14) is called the generating set of the principal filter Q2, 
and Q2 is said to be generated by A. Formally, then, a quantifier is a principal 
filter iff it is generated by some set A. 
3.4 What noun phrases denote principal filters? 
A distributive universal like every abstract is interpreted as a principal 
filter generated by the set denoted by its common noun. For example, every 
abstract is interpreted by the principal filter EVERY ABSTRACT generated 
by the set ABSTRACT: a set X is a set in EVERY ABSTRACT iff it contains 
all abstracts. 6 Bare numerals like three abstracts are in general not interpreted 
as principal filters, as we will See below. There is, however, one reading of three 
abstracts which we will claim is a principal filter, namely the referential reading 
of Fodor and Sag (1982). 
When interpreted referentially, an NP like three abstracts is interpreted 
by a quantifier like THREE ABSTRACTS with the following meaning: there 
are three concrete (but arbitrarily chosen) abstracts such that a set X is a 
set of THREE ABSTRACTS iff it contains those three abstracts. So THREE 
ABSTRACTS is generated by a set of three (arbitrarily chosen) abstracts. 7 
Under the non-referential reading, bare numerals like three abstracts are 
interpreted like the modified numeral at least three abstracts, which is inter­
preted by the quantifier AT LEAST THREE ABSTRACTS. It is easy to show 
that AT LEAST THREE ABSTRACTS is not a principal filter, because is 
not generated by any set A: If A contains all abstracts, then in any world 
with more than three abstracts, there is a set X such that X is in AT LEAST 
THREE ABSTRACTS, but A is not a subset of X. In fact, any set of exactly 
three abstracts will do. If A does not contain all abstracts, then there is some 
abstract al that is not in A. Since the world contains at least three abstracts 
we can form a set X such that X is in AT LEAST THREE ABSTRACTS 
but A is not a subset of X: for example X can be any set of three abstracts 
containing al' 
6NPs can be accidentally interpreted as principal filters simply because the universe E is 
too small For example, EXACTLY THREE ABSTRACTS is a filter in a world with only 
three abstracts. To deal with these cases it is possible to require that there is some model 
M such the NP is interpreted as a principal filter in M a.nd all of its extensions. 
7Thus, the abstracts are concrete but not pragmatically specific in any wa.y. It is not 
required that the speaker or anyone else knows which abstracts they are. 
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Similarly, a monotone decreasing quantifier like FEWER THAN THREE 
ABSTRACTS is never a principal filter in any world with at least three ab­
stracts. Again, we can see that FEWER THAN THREE ABSTRACTS cannot 
be generated by any set A. If A is not empty, then the empty set is a set X such 
that X is in FEWER THAN THREE ABSTRACTS but A is not a subset of X. 
If A is the empty set, then any set X with at least three abstracts is a superset 
of the empty set but is not in FEWER THAN THREE ABSTRACTS. 
3.5 An example 
Suppose the world is as in (15). 
(15) John, Bill and Mary are the only referees 1,2,3,4 are the only abstracts 
John read abstracts 1,2 and 4, Bill read abstracts 1 and 3, Mary read 
abstracts 2,3 and 4, and no one else read anything else. 
For readability, we represent relations graphically by trees. So the READ 
relation in (15) is represented by the tree in (16). 
(16) 
john 
/ I \ 
bill 
/ \ 
1 2 4 1 3 
mary 
/ I \ 
2 3 4 
The OWS reading of Two referees read every abstract can be calculated 
by the binary quantifier EVERY ABSTRACT>TWO REFEREES where A 
is ABSTRACT, the generating set of EVERY ABSTRACT. For example, if 
the READ relation is as in (15), then (EVERY ABSTRACT>TWO REFER­
EES)(READ) is true since every member of the set ABSTRACT was read by 
two referees. 
The OWS reading of Two referees read fewer than three abstracts on 
the other hand, cannot be calculated by the binary quantifier FEWER THAN 
THREE ABSTRACTS>TWO REFEREES no matter what A is. If A contains 
fewer than three abstra.cts then (FEWER THAN THREE ABSTRACTS>TWO 
REFEREES)(READ) is true if the READ relation is as in (15), since every 
member of A was read by two referees. But the OWS reading of Two referees 
read fewer than three abstracts is false in this case, because four abstracts were 
read by two referees. If A contains three abstracts or more, then (FEWER 
THAN THREE ABSTRACTS> TWO REFEREES)(READ) is false if fewer 
than three abstracts were read by two referees, for example if the READ rela­
tion is as represented by the tree in (17). 
(17) 
/' " 
j ohn bill 
/ I \ / \ 
1 2 4 1 3 
4 Empirical alternatives and extensions 
4.1 Alternative definitions of Q2>Q1 
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We defined Q2>Q1 as in (13) above to account for the empirical gener­
alization that NPs that take OWS can be interpreted as principal filters. If 
we had found, instead, that NPs that cannot be interpreted as principal filters 
take OWS too, we would have followed a similar reasoning using a different 
definition of Q2>Q1. For example, suppose NPs like at least three abstracts 
that are interpreted as monotone increasing quantifiers, but not as principal 
filters, had taken OWS. Then Q2>Ql could be defined by (18) instead of (13) 
above. 8 
(18) (Q2 > Ql)(lxAy[R(x, y))) = true 
iff 3A E Q2 such that 'Va E A, Ql(Ax[R(x, a))) = true 
This definition predicts that NPs that can take OWS can be interpreted 
as monotone increasing quantifiers, because if Q2>Ql is defined as in (18), 
then (Q2 > QI)(AxAy[R(x, y))) expresses an OWS reading just in case Q2 
is monotone increasing. 9 It is worth noting, however, that calculating with 
the binary quantifier in (18) is less simple than calculating with the binary 
quantifier in (13): (13) involves a fixed set A for each quantifier Q2, whereas 
(18) can in principle involve all the sets in Q2. 
It is even possible to modify Q2>Q1 in such a way that it calculates 
OWS readings for object NPs like FEWER THAN THREE ABSTRACTS 
or EXACTLY THREE ABSTRACTS. But the resulting binary quantifier is 
significantly more complex than even (18), because these object NPs are inter­
preted as quantifiers that are'not monotone increasing: If Q2 is not monotone 
increasing then the set A has to be maximal in some way with respect to 
8The eet A in (18) is required to be a witness of Q2. A more intuitive but equivalent 
definition would require it to be a witness· of Q2, namely a witness set that is a subset of 
every set that Q2 lives on. For the definitions of 'witness' and 'live on' see Barwise and 
Cooper (1981). 
9Tbis formal claim follows from the definition of monotone increasing quantifiers in (i) 
by an argument similar to the one in Section 3.3 above. 
(i) A quantifier Q2 is monotone increo.sing 
iffVX � E, (3A E Q2 such that A � X) iff X E Q2 
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Ay[Q1(AX[R(x, V)])]. For example, if there is a set A of fewer than three ab­
stracts that were read by two referees each, it does not mean that fewer than 
three abstracts were read by two referees. 
4.2 Possible extensions: three-place predicates 
We conclude this section with a brief informal discussion of possible ex­
tensions of the analysis to inverse scope with three-place predicates. 
A reading like (19), in which an indirect object takes scope over a direct 
object, can be derived by practically the same binary quantifier as EVERY 
STUDENT>TWO QUESTIONS. 
(19) At least four teachers assigned two questions to every student 
'at least four teachers are such that they assigned every student two 
(possibly different) questions' 
A reading like (20), in which an indirect object takes scope over both 
the subject and the direct object can be derived by a ternary quantifier, i.e., 
a set of ternary relations. This quantifier will be very similar in structure to 
Q2>Q1, but the relevant Q1 will be a binary quantifier itself. 
(20) At least four teachers assigned two questions to every student 
'every student is such that at least four teachers assigned two (possibly 
different) questions to him' 
A more drastic extension is needed to derive readings like (21), if they 
exist. The judgements tum out to be very delicate, especially if one is careful 
about distinguishing this reading from the relatively close readings in footnote 
10 . 10 11 
(21) At least fOUI teachers assigned two questions to three students 
'at least four teachers are such that they assigned each of three (possibly 
different) students two (possibly different) questions' 
laThe reading in (21) is different than the branching reading (under which different teach­
ers may assign different questions, but each teacher assigned the same two questions to "his" 
three students). It is also different than the reading in which the two of two questions is 
focused (under which each teacher assigned exactly two (possibly different) questions to 
each of the students he assigned questions to). 
11lt is easier to get a reading superficially similar to (21) for the sentence in (i). But this 
is arguably the "incorporation" reading 'at least four teachers are such that they assigned 
questions to three students' 
(i) At least four teachers assigned a question to three students 
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To get the reading in (21) it would be necessary to assume that the 
crucial set A in the definition of (Q2 > QI)(AYAz[R(x, y, z)]) can depend on 
x. That this kind of extension might be needed anyway might be indicated by 
readings like (22), in which an indirect object bound by the subject js taking 
scope over a direct object. 12 
(22) At least four teachers assigned two questions to each of their students 
'at least four teachers are such that they assigned each of their students 
two (possibly different) questions' 
5 Object wide scope and binary quantifiers 
We are arguing that OWS relies on a binary quantifier Q2>Q1 that is 
defined only when Q2 denotes a principal filter. Until now we have motivated 
the semantic aspects of this claim. The next thing to be explained is why we 
need specifically a binary quantifier for this purpose. This question pertains 
to the syntax-semantics interface. 
5.1 On productive reb racketing 
Let us recall from section 2 that an OWS reading iIl the general case is 
expressed by (23) (=6): 
(23) Q2(.\y[Q1(Ax[R(x, y)])]) 
As was pointed out there, this amounts to saying that (24), which com­
bines the meanings of the subject and the verb, to the exclusion of the object, 
is a subpart of the meaning of the sentence: 
(24) Ay[QI(Ax[R(x, y)])]) 
Under the assumption of compositionality, this entails that there is a 
syntactic constituent of the sentence that carries precisely this meaning. In 
grammars like Montague (1974) or May (1977), such a constituent is readily 
available. It is produced by quantifying in (25a) or, equivalently, by Quantifier 
Raising (25 b ): 
(25) a. Two referees read fewer than three abstracts 
/ \ 
fewer than three abstracts two referees read him1 
12That specificity does not exclude referential dependency is indicated by sentences like 
(i), which has a natural reading under which different boys are interested in different girls. 
(i) Every boy expressed an interest in a certain girl. 
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b. [s fewer than three abstractsi [s two referees i [[5 tj read ti ]] 
Similarly, a fiexible categorial grammar might achieve a comparable re­
bracketing of the Np· VP structure by commuting the arguments of the verb, 
or by composing the subject with the verb. We have seen that these syn� 
tactic processes overgenerate: they derive an OWS reading for any transitive 
sentence, including Two referees read fewer than three abstracts, which does 
not have any. On the other hand, we have also seen that the missing OWS 
readings reappear, for instance, when passivization or object fronting applies: 
(26) a. 
b. 
Fewer than three abstracts were read by two referees 
Fewer than three abstracts did two referees read 
From these we conclude that the grammar should not have productive, 
unconstrained syntactic devices that override the lexical hierarchy of argu­
ments. Such devices should only be available if there is independent justifica­
tion for their operation. Surface movement is one example. This entails that 
if the sentence exhibits no signs of syntactic rebracketing, an OWS reading 
can only be obtained in a special, non·productive manner. In 5.2 we show 
that under certain assumptions about semantic interpretation, this amounts 
to saying that the OWS reading is derived by a binary quantifier. In section 
6 we go on to show that the assumptions of 5.2 find their natural place in the 
context of semantic trees. 
5.2 Object wide scope as binary quantification 
We make the following assumptions concerning the semantic interpre­
tation of simple transitive sentences. First, the semantic interpretation of a 
transitive sentence without any surface movement consists of successive appli­
cations of the denotations of the NPs to the denotation of the verb. Second, 
NPs are interpreted as quantifiers that "saturate" the last 13 argument place 
of the predicate they apply to. Formally, the last assumption amounts to 
interpreting NPs by particular extensions (projections, lifts) of unary gen­
eralized quantifiers. The value of such a quantifier Q at an n-ary relation 
AXIl ••. Axn[R(Xl, ... , Xn)} is defined in (27), adapted from Keenan (1992). 
(27) Q(AXl, •.. Axn[R(Xll·", xn)]) = def 
AX}, ... , AXn-l[Q(AXn[R(Xh ... , Xn-I, xn)])] 
One consequence of our assumptions is that a subject wide scope reading 
can always be derived in a unary way, i.e., by successively applying the de­
notations of the NPs to the denotation of the verb. Formally, this is because 
13'Last' refers to the left to right order of the argument places. We are assuming that the 
lexical entry of a transitive verb V is V(agent,theme), where 'agent' and 'theme' are used, 
as usual, simply as cover terms for the actual thematic roles. 
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a subject wide scope reading is of the form Ql(Ax[Q2(Ay[R(x, y))))), which 
can be derived in accordance with (27) by first applying the denotation of the 
object to the denotation of the verb, and then applying the denotation of the 
subject to the result. 
It �o follows from these assumptions that an OWS reading cannot be 
derived in this particular way. Formally, this is because an OWS reading is of 
the form Q2(Ay[Q1(>'x[R(x, y)]))). And Ay[Ql(Ax[R(x, y)]] cannot be derived 
in accordance with (27) by applying Ql, the denotation of the subject NP to 
the denotation of the transitive verb. Thus, the only way to derive an OWS 
reading in accordance with the assumptions above is to derive it in a binary 
way, i.e., by interpreting the subject and the object together as one binary 
quantifier. Formally, this amounts to interpreting the pair consisting of the 
subject NP and the object NP as a binary quantifier Q, and deriving the OWS 
reading as Q(AXAy[R(x, y)]). 
If, on the other hand, the object is syntactically fronted as in (28) and a 
constituent with the interpretation Ay[Ql(Ax[R(x, Y)])] is provided, the OWS 
reading does not require binary quantification: 
(28) Fewer than three abstracts did two referees read 
'there are fewer than three abstracts such that each of them was read 
by two (possibly different) referees' 
6 Semantic Trees 
Untill now we have used trees simply as graphic representations of rela­
tions. While they do serve such an illustrative purpose, in Ben-Shalom (1992, 
in progress) they are also entities of a theory that treats NP-denotations as 
operations on n-ary relations. Algebraically, classes of such operations are 
characterized by invariance conditions on a set of pairs consisting of a k-tuple 
and a k+l-ary relation. One advantage of thls approach is that it allows one to 
talk about generalized quantifiers as well as argument and predicate anaphors, 
superlatives, etc. in a uniform fashion, as special cases of arity reducing oper­
ations. In this paper we will exploit the fact that this theory has an intuitive 
representation in terms of graphic trees, and so the intuitions behind it can be 
conveyed without recourse to algebraic devices. Specifically, in 6.1 we give an 
interpretation of the definition in (27) as tree operations on subtrees of height 
one. This allows one to see why subject wide scope should be productive and 
object wide scope should not. In 6.2 we use tree operations to give a sim­
ple proof of the unreducibility of the quantifier EVERY ABSTRACT>TWO 
REFEREES. 
6.1 Generalized quantifiers as tree operations 
The extended generalized quantifiers as defined in (27) correspond to tree 
operations that operate on subtrees of height one, one at a time. Suppose the 
world is as in (15) above, repeated as (29): 
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(29) John, Bill and Mary are the only referees. 1,2,3,4 are the only abstracts. 
The READ relation is as represented by the tree in (30) 
(30) 
� 
john 
I I \ 
----­
bill 
/ \ 
1 2 4 1 3 
mary 
/ I \ 
2 3 4  
The value of THREE ABSTRACTS(READ) can be calculated as in (31), 
where the operation defined by the quantifier THREE ABSTRACTS operates 
on a subtree of height one, ODe at a time: If THREE ABSTRACTS is true of 
the set of objects dominated by the root of the subtree, the subtree is deleted 
but its root is kept «(31b) and (31d)). If THREE ABSTRACTS is false of the 
set of objects dominated by the root, both the subtree and its root are deleted 
((31c)). 
(31) a. 
1 
b. 
c. 
d. 
� '-..... 
j ohn bill 
/ I \ / \ 
2 4 1 3 
� -----
j ohn bill 
/ \ 
1 3 
/"" 
john mary 
/ I \ 
2 3 4  
/""-
john mary 
mary 
/ I \ 
2 3 4 
mary 
/ I \ 
2 3 4 
It is easy to see that a subject wide scope reading can always be calcu­
lated in such a way that (the operations defined by) the denotations of the 
NPs operate on subtrees of height one of the semantic tree representing the 
denotation of the verb: the denotation of the object NP operates on the de­
notation of the verb as in (31), and the denotation of the subject operates on 
the resulting tree. For example, the value of the subject wide scope reading 
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of Fewer than four referees read three abstracts can be 
·
calculated by apply­
ing the operation defined by FEWER THAN FOUR REFEREES to the tree 
representing THREE ABSTRACTS (READ ) in (31d) above. Since FEWER 
THAN FOUR REFEREES is true of the set {john,mary} the truth value of 
this reading in the world we are assuming is 'true'. 
I t is also easy to see that an 0 WS reading cannot be calculated in such 
a way that (the operations defined by) the denotations of the NPs operate 
on subtrees of height one of the semantic tree representing the denotation of 
the verb. Rather, it is the binary quantifier derived from the denotations of 
both the subject and the object that operates on the semantic tree of height 
two which represents the denotation of the verb. For example, the value of the 
OWS reading of Two referees read every abstract can be calculated by applying 
the binary quantifier (EVERY ABSTRACT> TWO REFEREES) to the tree 
representing the READ relation in (30). Since EVERY ABSTRACT>TWO 
REFEREES is true of the binary relation represented by (30) , the truth value 
of this reading in the world we are assuming is 'true'. 
6.2 The unreducibility of object wide scope readings 
A binary quantifier Q is called unreducible if there are no unary quantifiers 
Q3 and Q4 such that (32a) has the same truth value as (32b) for every binary 
relation R. 
(32) a. 
b. 
Q('\x'\y[R(x, 31)]) 
Q3{'\x[Q4(Ay[R(x, 31)])]) 
In this section we use semantic trees to prove that the meaning expressed 
by the OWS reading of Two referees read every abstract defines an unreducible 
binary quantifier. That is to say, there are no unary generalized quantifiers 
Q3 and Q4 such that (33a) has the same truth value as (33b) for every R: 
(33) a. 
b. 
EVERY ABST RACT(A y[TWO REF EREES(AX[R(x, 31)]) ]) 
Q3(Ax[Q4(Ay[R(x, 31)])]) 
We prove this fact by a graphic proof technique that is based on semantic 
trees. The technique allows for a simplification of the unreducibility proofs in 
van Benthem (1989) and Keenan (1992). It is formally motivated in Ben­
Shalom (1992). 
For the purpose of the proof it will be convenient to think of both (33a) 
and (33b) as defining binary quantifiers. We will call them by the mnemonic 
names EVERY ABSTRACT-TWO REFEREES and Q30Q4, respectively. We 
will think of binary quantifiers as functions from binary relations to truth 
values, and rewrite (33) as (34). 
(34) a. (E�RY ABSTRACT - TWO REF EREES)(R) 
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b. (Q30Q4)(R) 
Our overall goal is to prove that whatever unary quantifiers Q3 and Q4 
are , Q30Q4 will have a different truth value than EVERY ABSTRACT -TWO 
REFEREES on at least one binary relation R. To prove this we prove that 
whatever unary quantifier Q4 is, there are two binary relations R and R' such 
that Q30Q4 has the same truth value on both R and R', whereas EVERY 
ABSTRACT·TWO REFEREES is true of R and false of R'. 
We apply the following graphic reasoning. Suppose Q4 is AT LEAST 
TWO ABSTRACTS, and that R is the binary relation represented by the tree 
in (35). 
(35) 
john 
/ I \ 
/'" '-...... 
bill 
/ \ 
1 2 4 1 3  
mary 
/ I \ 
2 3 4 
Then whether john is a member of AT LEAST TWO ABSTRACTS(Ay[R(x, y)]) 
depends only on the truth value of AT LEAST TWO ABSTRACTS( {1,2,4}). 
Therefore (Q30AT LEAST TWO ABSTRACTS) (R) is the same truth value 
as (Q3-AT LEAST TWO ABSTRACTS)(R'), where R' is the binary relation 
represented by the tree in (36). 
(36) 
/'" I ''-
john bill mary 
/ \ / \ / I \ 
1 3 1 3 2 3 4 
This is so because AT LEAST THREE ABSTRACTS( {1,2,4}) = AT LEAST 
THREE ABSTRACTS( {1,3}), and the only difference between R and R' is 
that the subtree in which 'john' dominated '1' and '2' and '4' was replaced by 
a subtree in which 'john' dominates '1' and '3'. 
Deleting a subtree is just the special case of replacing a subtree with 
the empty subtree. So suppose Q4 is the unary quantifier FEWER THAN 
THREE ABSTRACTS, R is the binary relation represented by the tree in 
(36), and R' is the binary relation represented by the tree in (37). 
(37) 
/ ""'-
bill mary 
/ \ / I \ 
1 3 2 3 4  
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Then (Q30FEWER THAN THREE ABSTRACTS)(R) = (Q30FEWER THAN 
THREE ABSTRACTS)(R) , because FEWER THAN THREE ABSTRACTS(1,3) 
= FEWER THAN THREE ABSTRACTS(0), and the only difference between 
R and R' is that the subtree headed by 'john' was deleted. The last fact we 
need for the proof is that we can assume that Q4 is positive, i.e., Q4( 0) = 
false. Intuitively, this is true because of eqwvalences like the following: 'Every 
referee read fewer than three abstracts' is equivalent to 'No referee read at 
least three abstracts'. 
The proof: 
We show that there is no unary quantifier Q4 such that (EVERY ABSTRACT· 
TWO REFEREES)(R) = (Q30Q4)(R) for every binary relation R. 
L H Q4( {1,2,4}) = false, then (Q30Q4)(R) = (Q30Q4)(R') , where R is 
the binary relation represented by (38a) and R' is the binary relation repre­
sented by (3Sb). 
(38) a. 
� I ---
john bill mary 
/ I \ / \ / I \ 
1 2 4 1 3 2 3 4 
b. 
/' '-.... 
bill mary 
/ \ / I \ 
1 3 2 3 4 
But (EVERY ABSTRACT-TWO REFEREES)(R) = true and (EVERY 
ABSTRA CT - TWO REFEREES) (R') = false, because every abstract was read 
by two referees in R, but abstracts 1,2 and 4 were not read by two referees in 
R'. 
2. Similarly, if Q4( {1,3}) = false, then (Q3oQ4) (R) = (Q30Q4)(R') , 
where R is the binary relation represented by (39a) and R' is the binary relation 
represented by (39b). 
(39) a. 
� I ---
john bill mary 
/ I \ / \ / I \ 
1 2 4 1 3 2 3 4 
b. 
/" � 
john mary 
/ I \ / I \ 
1 2 4 2 3 4 
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But (EVERY ABSTRACT-TWO REFEREES)(R) = true and (EVERY 
ABSTRACT- TWO REFEREES)(R') = false, because every abstract was read 
by two referees in R, but abstracts 1 and 3 were not read by two referees in 
R'. 
3. The only other option is that Q4( {1 ,2,4}) = Q4( {1,3}) = true, so 
(Q3oQ4)(R) = (Q30Q4)(R'), where R is the binary relation represented by 
(40a) and R' is the binary relation represented by (40b). 
(40) a. 
� I ............ 
john bill mary 
I I \ / \ / I \ 
1 2 4 1 3 2 3 4 
b. 
/ I '-
john bill mary 
I \ / \ / I \ 
1 3 1 3 2 3 4 
But in this case again, (EVERY ABSTRACT-TWO REFEREES)(R) 
= true and (EVERY ABSTRACT·TWO REFEREES)(R') = false, because 
every abstract was read by two referees in R, but abstracts 2 and 4 were not 
read by two referees in R'. 
Therefore there is no unary quantifier Q4 such that (EVERY ABSTRACT­
TWO REFEREES)(R) = (Q30Q4)(R) for every binary relation R. Therefore 
EVERY ABSTRACT-TWO REFEREES is an unreducible binary quantifier. 
7 Conclusion 
In this paper we have argued for the claims in (41): 
(41) a. 
b. 
c. 
An Object Wide Scope (OWS) reading exists only if the object 
NP is interpreted as a principal filter. 
The claim in (a) follows if an OWS reading is derived by a binary 
quantifier in which the interpretation of the object NP defines 
a crucial domain. 
The cla.im that OWS readings are derived by binary quantifica­
tion can be motivated within an algebraic approach to general­
ized quantifiers which is called semantic trees. 
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